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Notes
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
SUBMERGED LANDS ACT-PROPERTY
POWER OF CONGRESS
The States of Alabama and Rhode Island, invoking the orig-
inal jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,1 entered motions for leave
to file complaints against the States of Louisiana, Florida, Texas
and California, the Secretaries of the Treasury, Interior, and
Navy, and the Treasurer of the United States. The petitioners
requested that the Submerged Lands Act 2 be decreed unconsti-
tutional as an invalid exercise of Congress' trusteeship over
public property 3 and as an abdication or delegation by Congress
to the defendant states of essential and non-delegable elements of
national sovereignty. In the alternative they requested that the
act be declared to give the defendant states no right to, or power,
authority, or dominion over any lands or natural resources, which
was vested by the Constitution in the United States to be exer-
cised for the benefit of all the states and the citizens of the United
States. In case the Court should recognize these rights in defen-
dant states, petitioners asked that the act be construed to grant
to the defendant States of Louisiana, Florida and Texas no rights
to the maritime belt lying beyond the three-mile limit. The
petitioners further requested that the defendant states be en-
joined from exercising control over this area and extracting
natural resources therefrom; that the named federal officials be
enjoined from acquiescing in the claims of the defendant states
under color or authority of the Submerged Lands Act; and that
these officials be restrained from paying to defendant states the
funds collected while the lands were under federal control and
held in trust by those officials for the United States and its citi-
zens. The Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, denied the
motions, Justices Black and Douglas dissenting.4 The Court
1. U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2(1).
2. 67 STAT. 29 (1953), 43 U.S.C.A. § 1301 et seq. (Supp. 1953).
3. U.S. CONST. Art. IV, § 3(2).
4. Chief Justice Warren did not participate. Justice Reed, in a con-
curring opinion, Alabama v. Texas, 74 Sup. Ct. 481, 482 (1954) stated that the
right ceded by Public Law 31 (the Submerged Lands Act) was a property
right within the disposal power of Congress. Justice Black and Justice
Douglas, in separate dissents, id. at 483, 486, expressed the view that Con-
gress' power to enact Public Law 31 was subject to sufficient doubt to re-
quire that the complainant states be given a full opportunity to challenge
the statute.
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stated that under Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, of the Consti-
tution and the interpretations of that article in prior decisions, 5
Congress has unlimited power to dispose of and make rules and
regulations respecting the territory and property of the United
States and that it is not for the courts to say how that trust shall
be administered. Alabama v. Texas and Rhode Island v. Louisi-
ana, 74 Sup. Ct. 481 (1954), rehearing denied, 74 Sup. Ct. 674
(1954).
The petitioners based their claim on the contention that the
property power of Congress must ultimately be limited by the
government's position as trustee for the nation and that a valid
disposition of government property must inure to the benefit of
the public. In support of this proposition, they relied on Helver-
ing v. Davis,6 which held that federal spending must be for the
general welfare, and on Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois,7 which
invalidated a transfer of state-owned property to a private cor-
poration as a perversion of the trust under which the property
was held for the benefit of all the citizens of the state. It was
contended that the Submerged Lands Act was not a valid exer-
cise of the trust granted to the federal government because the
government was granting national assets valued at over fifty
billion dollars to four states to the prejudice of the other states.,
The petitioners further insisted that Congress had no power
to dispose of the federal government's right to the resources in
question because the "paramount rights" in the land and re-
sources did not constitute "property" within the meaning of
Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, of the Constitution, but formed
instead part of the non-delegable responsibility of the federal
government to provide for the common defense and to conduct
foreign relations. The two dissenting Justices agreed and argued
that this was the basis of the government's position in United
States v. California9 and the subsequent United States v. Texas",
5. The cases referred to by the Court are United States v. California,
332 U.S. 19, 27 (1947); United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474
(1915); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536 (1911); Camfield v. United
States, 167 U.S. 518, 524 (1897); United States v. Gratiot, 14 Pet. 526, 537 (U.S.
1840).
6. 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
7. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
8. They argued that the distribution of the funds collected while the
lands were under federal control was invalid for the same reason.
9. 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
10. 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
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and United States v. Louisiana" decisions, and expressed reluc-
tance to overrule those decisions. The majority of the Court were
satisfied with the wording of the act, which specifically reserved
to the United States not only the servitude of navigation, but
the "rights in and powers of regulation and control of said lands
and navigable waters for the constitutional purposes of com-
merce, navigation, national defense, and international affairs.'
1 2
The petitioners also questioned whether under international
law the lands beyond the three-mile limit constituted "property"
of the United States. The use of the term "paramount rights" by
the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the govern-
ment indicates that all are aware of the far-reaching consequences
of claiming fee title to lands lying under the high seas.' 3 As
argued by Rhode Island "both by rule of international law and
determination of the United States Government in the conduct
of its foreign relations, the permissible width of the belt of terri-
torial waters is three nautical miles." The United States has re-
fused to recognize the claims of foreign powers to territory be-
yond the three-mile limit along their coasts,14 and as recently as
1951 the International Court of Justice "has treated as a justi-
ciable question the claims of the United Kingdom that Norway
11. 339 U.S. 699 (1950).
12. 67 STAT. 29, 32 (1953), 43 U.S.C.A. § 1301, 1314 (Supp. 1953).
13. By Presidential Proclamation of September 28, 1945, President Tru-
man first announced the interest of the United States in the area in question,
stating that the "Government of the United States regards the natural
resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the
high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States as appertaining
to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control. In cases where
the continental shelf extends to the shores of another State, or is shared
with an adjacent State, the boundary shall be determined by the United
States and the State concerned in accordance with equitable principles.
The character as high seas of the waters above the continental shelf and
the right to their free and unimpeded navigation are in no way thus af-
fected." 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 45 (Supp. 1946). The Supreme Court, in the
California, Louisiana, and Texas decisions spoke of the "paramount rights"
of the United States to the area and in the instant decision made no mention
of fee title. See Vom Baur, Confiscation by Judicial Decree: The Procedural
Course of the Tidelands Cases, 27 TULANE L. REv. 286, 307 et seq. (1953). The
Congress itself came closest to claiming actual ownership of the area in the
Submerged Lands Act, stating: "The United States hereby releases and
relinquishes unto said states . . . . except as otherwise reserved . . ., all
right, title, and interest of the United States, if any it has, in and to all
said lands .. " (Italics supplied.) See 67 STAT. 29, 30, 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301,
1311 (Supp. 1953). In the legislative discussion preceding the adoption of
the Submerged Lands Act, the claims of the United States were referred to
as "quit-claim" rights. See 2 U.S. Con CONG. & ADMIN. NEws, 83d Cong.,
1st Sess., 1953, p. 1439 et seq. (1953).
14. With respect to Mexico, see 1 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 639-41 (1940), as cited by Brief for Alabama in Support of Motion for
Leave to File Complaint, p. 21.
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was, by legislation attempting to include part of the high seas
within its boundaries."'15
Several constitutional and procedural questions raised by the
pleadings were not discussed by the Court. An important issue
not dealt with was whether the petitioners could invoke the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. Both Alabama and Rhode
Island claimed standing in dual capacity, as sovereigns protecting
their interests as states, and as quasi-sovereign and parens patriae
attacking a measure having an adverse effect upon the economic
welfare of a substantial number of their citizens. Alabama and
Rhode Island, as sovereigns, contended that the Submerged
Lands Act, by granting the Gulf states the right to extend their
boundaries beyond the limits permitted the other coastal states, 16
and by granting to the defendant states the only area known to
possess minerals in valuable quantities, 7 denied the petitioners
the equal footing and equal treatment guaranteed them by the
Constitution. Alabama, in addition, contended, for the same
reasons, that the act violated its guarantee of equal status'8 con-
tained in the act admitting it to statehood. Both states also con-
tended it was unequal treatment for Congress to grant to the
defendant states the revenues which had accumulated while the
area in question was under federal control.' 9 In their capacity
as quasi-sovereign and parens patriae they claimed that their
15. Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), Judgment of Dec. 18,
1951: I.C.J. Rep. 1951, p. 116, at 126, as cited by Brief for Alabama in Sup-
port of Motion for Leave to File Complaint, pp. 21, 23.
16. Under the terms of the Submerged Lands Act, the Atlantic and
Pacific coastal states are limited in their claims to three nautical miles,
while in the Gulf of Mexico the maximum permissible extent of any claim
is three leagues or 10 miles, provided that such claims have been outstand-
ing at the time of entrance into the Union or have been ratified by the
Congress since that time. See 67 STAT. 29, 31 (1953), 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301, 1312
(Supp. 1953). The petitioners argued that by ratifying the acts admitting
them to statehood on an equal footing, the defendant states renounced all
claims. The Court did not make mention of these claims, but they are of
vital importance today. See page 84 supra.
17. The most valuable deposits in the Gulf of Mexico area are off the
coasts of Louisiana and Texas.
18. U.S. CONST. Art. IV, § 3(1). The petitioners were referring to the
interpretation which has been given this article. For a discussion of the
"equal footing" clause, see LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 697 et seq. (Cor-
win ed. 1952). For a discussion of the acts admitting the states concerned to
statehood, see Brief for Alabama in Support of Motion for Leave to File
Complaint, App. B, pp. 83-85.
19. Effective June 5, 1950, the date of the decree of United States V.
CaZifornia, the defendant states of Louisiana, Texas, and California were
required to account for all revenues obtained from the marginal seas, The
United States had requested accounting from August 23, 1947, but this was
amended by the Court to the date above. These funds were placed in trust
with the defendant government officials to await final determination.
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citizens had interests in proper allocation of federal property and
also that the Submerged Lands Act constituted a threat to the
fishing industries of their respective states. Alabama contended
that its citizens would be denied access or severely hampered in
gaining admission to the fishing waters off the coasts of defendant
states if control of waters beyond the three-mile limit were
granted to those states.20 Rhode Island contended that the grant-
ing of territory beyond the three-mile international limit con-
stituted a moral breach by the United States of its international
agreements to recognize that boundary; that as a consequence
Rhode Island citizens might be denied access to the fishing waters
off Canada. 21 The petitioners claimed that since these contentions
represented specific controversies and not abstract questions of
political power, their leave to file complaint did not conflict with
the principles established in Massachusetts v. Mellon.22
The defendant states contended that the petitioners had
suffered no real injury, that they had no standing to contest the
validity of the Submerged Lands Act on behalf of their citizens,
that they had no standing to challenge the alleged boundary
claims of the defendants, that the request for injunction was pre-
mature, that relief should be sought in the lower courts, and
that the United States was an indispensable party to the suit.
The petitioners replied to the last contention that, where the
action of a government official is illegal, relief may be obtained
by enjoining such action without making the government a
party.23 By going straight to the basic issue of the extent of
20. Alabama expressed concern that the State of Louisiana would adopt
conservation measures or licensing requirements which would operate to
deny or restrict Alabama citizens in their fishing privileges off the coast of
Louisiana.
21. "By the treaty of Oct. 20, 1818 between Britain and the United States
American fishermen have the right to fish off the southern coasts of Labra-
dor and Newfoundland, and are excluded 'within three marine miles of any
of the coasts . . . ' elsewhere in Canada." Rhode Island, Brief for Com-
plainant, p. 12, citing 1 MALLOY, TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL ACTS,
PROTOCOLS AND AGREEMENTS 631 (1910) and 1 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 783 (1940).
"This implicit recognition of three-mile territorial limits was made
explicit by the Treaty of Jan. 23, 1924 between Britain . . . and the United
States which was binding on Canada as well as Newfoundland." Rhode
Island, Brief for Complainant, p. 12, citing Treaty Series No. 685, 43 STAT.
1761 (1924), and 3 REPORTS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS (U.N. Pub.
1949 V. 2) 1611 (1949).
22. 262 U.S. 447 (1923). This case has been consistently followed in deter-
mining the right of a state to sue for its citizens.
23. The complainants quoted from the case of Larson v. Domestic &
Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 690 (1949): ". . . a suit against an
officer is not a suit against the United States where 'the conduct against
which specific relief is sought is beyond the officer's powers' under the Con-
stitution." Rhode Island, Reply Brief for Complainant, p. 19.
1954]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Congress' property power, the Court either failed to take note
of the questions so presented, or, by remaining silent, resolved
them in the petitioners' favor. In upholding the power of Con-
gress to determine the submerged lands issue the Supreme Court
has apparently recognized the essentially political nature of the
question. The Court may, however, still be called upon to inter-
pret the Submerged Lands Act since the extent of control granted
to the states remains to be determined.2 4
Charles M. Lanier
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEGREGATION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Plaintiffs, Negro children, sought admission to public schools
restricted by law' to the use of white children in Kansas, South
Carolina, Virginia, Delaware, and the District of Columbia. In all
of the state cases the plaintiffs alleged that the separate facilities
provided for Negroes were unequal and that by being required
to use the unequal facilities they were being deprived of the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. In the District of Columbia case the plaintiffs
claimed that requiring them to use any separate facilities denied
them due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.
The Federal District Court in Kansas found the facilities to
be equal for both Negro and white children and refused to order
the Negroes' admission to white schools. 2 The Federal District
Court in South Carolina found the facilities to be unequal, and
ordered South Carolina to provide equal facilities but did not
24. Sen. J. Res. 145, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (April 1, 1954), was one attempt
to earmark the revenues from such lands for educational purposes. The
United States Department of Interior has recently decided to lease the
lands beyond the limits stated in the Submerged Lands Act.
1. (a) A Kansas statute permits, but does not require, cities of more
than 15,000 population to maintain separate schools for white and Negro
students. KAN. GEN. STAT. § 72-1724 (1949). (b) The South Carolina Consti-
tution and statutes require segregation in public schools. S.C. CONST. Art.
XI, § 7; S.C. CODE 21-751 (1952). (c) The Virginia Constitution and statutes
require segregation in public schools. VA. CONST. § 140; VA. CODE § 22-221
(1950). (d) The Delaware Constitution and statutes require segregation
in public schools. DEL. CONST. Art. X, § 2; DEL. CODE § 14-141 (1953). (e)
District of Columbia statutes require segregation. 18 STAT., pt. 2, p. 33 (1873).
2. Court relied on the separate but equal doctrine of Plessy v. Fergu-
son, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896), from which it quoted: "'The object of the [four-
teenth] amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the
two races before the law, but in the nature of things it could not have been
intended to abolish distinctions based upon color. Brown v. Board of
Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797, 798 (D. Kan. 1951).
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